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City Harvest case and the separation of powers  
Published in Straits Times, 09 Feb 2018, p. A21. 
By Goh Yihan 
Verdict provides important example of how the courts and Parliament play different roles 
in Singapore's legal system 
The Court of Appeal last week upheld the reduced sentences passed in the City Harvest Church 
(CHC) case. 
Six former church leaders were charged with having conspired to commit the aggravated offence 
of criminal breach of trust (CBT) as an "agent" under Section 409 of the Penal Code. 
Departing from the earlier interpretation that had stood for the past 40 years, the court decided 
that Section 409 applied only to professional agents, which the former church leaders were not. 
The charges were reduced to Section 406, which provided for shorter terms of imprisonment. 
This decision has triggered a review of our CBT laws. It is clear that Section 409, which was 
enacted some 150 years ago, is no longer adequate to deal with the CBT cases in the 21st 
century. 
So, the Attorney-General's Chambers has stated that it will work with the relevant ministries on 
appropriate reform. 
Earlier this week, the Minister for Law, Mr K. Shanmugam, reiterated the Government's 
intention to amend the law together, with other wide-ranging amendments to the Penal Code. 
Even the Court of Appeal itself acknowledged that such a reform is long overdue. 
However, why couldn't the court have reformed the law itself, instead of leaving it to 
Parliament? 
DIFFERENT ROLES 
The answer is that the courts are separate from Parliament. Each exercises a different power. 
As the Court of Appeal explained in a 2014 case, the courts cannot exercise legislative power - 
that is, the power to enact legislation - because they do not have the mandate to do so. The 
mandate to promulgate laws belongs to the duly elected Members of Parliament. So, the courts 
have declined to reform existing legislation, even when it is clear that such laws are outdated. 
For example, the Court of Appeal decided in 2009 that an illegitimate child could not claim 
support under the Inheritance (Family Provision) Act. This Act introduced English law as it 
stood in 1938. 
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The court reasoned that when Parliament passed the Act in 1966, there was no indication that it 
disagreed with the prevailing English law, which denied support to illegitimate children. The 
court had to give effect to Parliament's intention even as it urged for reform. 
Another example is when the High Court in 2005 dealt with the presumption of death under 
Section 110 of the Evidence Act. The applicant urged that her estranged father be presumed dead 
as he had been uncontactable for years. 
The court dismissed the application as the applicant could not satisfy the requirement that her 
father had not been heard of by those who were not estranged from him. The court commented 
that Section 110, being enacted over 100 years ago, was in need of reform. It may be unfair to 
place the burden on estranged family members to show that someone else, who should have 
heard about the missing person, did not. 
It is for good reasons that the courts do not exercise legislative powers. 
For one, legislation is usually wide-ranging in scope and effect. Courts, which deal only with the 
cases before them, may not be well equipped to carry out such wide-ranging reforms. 
Furthermore, whereas Parliament has the resources to consult with various stakeholders on the 
effect of legislation, the courts cannot do so as they are constrained to resolving the immediate 
dispute between the parties before them. 
The courts are also not accountable to the electorate in the same way that Parliament is. 
DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS 
More importantly, it would affect the courts' legitimacy if they were to exercise legislative 
power, and compromise their role to administer the rule of law objectively. 
It is therefore entirely legitimate for the Court of Appeal in the CHC case to leave the reform of 
Section 409 to Parliament. In not exercising the legislative power, all it could do - and did - was 
to interpret the law according to the prevailing intention of Parliament, as discerned from 
materials at the time of Section 409's enactment. 
However, this is not to say that the courts do not develop the law. 
Instead of legislative power, the courts exercise judicial power. By this, the courts are tasked 
with interpreting legislation. The courts are here concerned with giving effect to Parliament's 
intent at the time the legislation was enacted. Thus, developments after the legislation was 
enacted are generally irrelevant. 
In the CHC case, it was argued by the prosecution before the High Court that since Parliament 
had left Section 409 untouched until now, it must have agreed with the courts' earlier 
interpretation that stood for over 40 years. 
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A majority of the High Court in the CHC case dismissed this fact as irrelevant. The Court of 
Appeal did not disagree with the High Court's conclusion. Indeed, it would be speculative to rely 
on inaction by Parliament as indicative of any overt intention. 
Through interpreting legislation, the courts may sometimes advance the law. This was such in 
the CHC case, where a majority of the High Court and the Court of Appeal departed from the 
earlier interpretation of Section 409 that originated in a High Court decision some 40 years ago. 
It is noteworthy that the proper interpretation of Section 409 had come before the Court of 
Appeal for the first time in the CHC case. It never had the opportunity to examine the meaning 
of Section 409 in detail before. 
Being the highest court of the land, the Court of Appeal is duty-bound to give its view on the 
proper interpretation of Section 409. It is in this context, and after a thorough analysis that 
included references to the relevant legal principles, historical material and foreign case law, that 
the Court of Appeal disagreed with the earlier interpretation of Section 409 that had stood for 
over 40 years. 
COMMON LAW 
Indeed, courts sometimes do depart from longstanding legal positions. The Court of Appeal has 
the power to depart from even its own decisions, as its 1994 Practice Statement on Judicial 
Precedent spells out. 
The courts may disagree as to what Parliament's intention is, but that does not hide the fact that 
they are ultimately concerned with giving effect to Parliament's intention, and not with reforming 
the law. 
The courts also advance the law by developing the "common law". The common law, so-called 
because it was "common" to all of England in the past, is made by judges based on precedent. 
By this process, judges develop the common law one case at a time, building on earlier cases to 
advance legal principles. An example is the development of the "tort of harassment" in a 2001 
High Court case. The court acknowledged that the existing common law did not cater for 
harassing conduct outside of a person's residence. So, the court developed the common law to 
include a new tort of harassment, which covered wider harassing conduct. 
However, the common law can be superseded by Parliament. Such was the case when Parliament 
enacted the Protection from Harassment Act in 2014, which codified the tort of harassment. 
The CHC case may have highlighted the inadequacy of our CBT laws, but it also provides an 
important example of how the legislative and judicial powers are separate under our system. It is 
a demonstration of how our system, founded on the separation of powers, works in practice. 
The writer is dean of the School of Law at the Singapore Management University. 
